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Recovery of Punitive Damages Against Municipalities:
Young v. City of Des Moines
Despite the recent trend toward abrogation of the common-law
immunity of municipal corporations,' it has generally been agreed that,
absent contrary statutory expression, municipalities are protected from
punitive damage awards in civil -actions. This rejection of punitive
damages had predominated as the majority rule in the United States since
the middle of the nineteenth century. In Young v. City of Des Moines,3
however, the Supreme Court of Iowa rejected this majority rule, adopted
in one of its own prior decisions, 4 and permitted an award of punitive
damages against the city of Des Moines. Although the court gave
considerable attention to the policy arguments concerning municipal
liability for punitive damages, its holding was primarily based on its
interpretation of the Iowa statute that abrogated the common-law
immunity of municipalities.5
This Comment first surveys the origin of and justification for punitive
damages and the general principles that govern their distribution. The
Young rationale supporting punitive damages against municipalities is
then contrasted with the majority view forbidding them. Finally, this
Comment will demonstrate that the allowance of punitive damages against
a municipality should not be a mere progression of the abrogation of
common-law municipal immunity. There are sound policy reasons for
maintaining this limited protection that municipalities enjoy.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: BACKGROUND
A. In General
The theory of punitive damages developed in the common law. 6 Civil
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 131 (4th ed. 1971).
2. City Council v. Gilmer & Taylor, 33 Ala. 116,70 Am. Dec. 562 (1858); Smith v. District of
Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. App. 1975); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); City of
Chicago v. Kelly, 69 IlL 475 (1873); City of Chicago v. Langlass, 52111.256,4 Am. Rep. 603 (1869); City
of Gary v. Falcone, 348 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); M'Gary v. President of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 674,
43 Am. Dec. 239 (La. 1846); Fossv. Maine Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d 339 (Me. 1973); Desforge v. City
of West St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205,42 N.W.2d 633 (1950); Town of Newton v. Wilson, 128 MISS. 726,91
So. 419 (1922); Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968); Hunt v. City of Boonville,
65 Mo. 620, 27 Am. Rep. 299 (1877); Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N.H. 387,6 Am. Rep. 526 (1870);
Rascoe v. Tox n of Farmington, 62 N.M. 51,304 P.2d 575 (1956); Brown v. Village ofDeming,56N.M.
302,243 P.2d 609 (1952); Rannells v. City ofCleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1,321 N.E.2d 885 (1975); Ni.xon
v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1976); Clarke v. City of Greer, 231 S.C. 327, 98 S.E.2d 751
(1957); Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Cole v. City of Houston,
442 S.W.2d 445 (rex. Civ. App. 1969); Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323,42 Am. Rep. 780
(1882).
3. 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978).
4. Bennett v. City of Marion, 102 Iowa 425, 71 N.W. 360 (1897).
5. 41 IOWA CODE ANN. § 613A.2 (West Supp. 1979). See note75 infra for text of this section.
6. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897). There are, however, four states (Louisiana,
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law jurisdictions have prohibited them under any circumstances. Punitive
damages, often called vindictive damages, smart money, or exemplary
damages,' are awarded in civil actions to punish the defendant rather than
to compensate the plaintiff.9 They are, therefore, measured not by the
plaintiff's loss, but by the heinousness of the offender's wrongdoing. In
addition, the defendant's pecuniary resources may be admitted into
evidence in order to determine the amount that will adequately punish
him.'0 Although each jurisdiction has specific criteria, punitive damages
are generally recoverable when the defendant's misconduct is aggravated,
and the state of mind of the offender is malicious, wanton, willful,
oppressive, or reckless." There is not, however, an absolute right to a
punitive damage award;12 the factfinder determines within its own
discretion whether they are appropriate. 3
There can be no cause of action based upon punitive damages alone.14
"If he [the plaintiff] has no cause of action independent of a supposed right
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington) that do not recognize punitive damages as a type of
recovery. Vincent v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917); Burt v.
Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238,28 N.E. 1 (1891); Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68,30 Am. Rep. 814
(1878); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891).
7. Cooperative de Seguros Multiples v. San Juan, 289 F. Supp. 858 (D.P.R. 1968); Fay v,
Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1873).
8. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1892); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 363 (1851); Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702,242 N.W.2d 494 (1976); Fay v. Parker,
53 N.H. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1873); Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220,6 S.E. 485 (1888). See also Belli,
Punitive Damages: An Historical Perspective, TRIAL, Dec. 1977, at 40.
9. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1892); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S.
(13 How). 363 (1851); French v. Deane, 19 Colo. 504,36 P. 609 (1894); Schmitt v. Kurrus, 234 111,578,
85 N.E. 261 (1908); Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971); Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277
(1859); Norel v. Grochowski, 51 R.I. 376, 155 A. 357 (1931); Wilson v. Oldroyd, I Utah 2d 362, 267
P.2d 759 (1954). But cf. Lucas v. Michigan Cent. R., 98 Mich. 1, 56 N.W. 1039 (1893) (punitive
damages are only recognized as compensation to a plaintiff); Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150
A. 692 (1930) (punitive damages cannot exceed the expenses for cost of litigation, less taxable costs,
and therefore are compensatory in nature).
10. -Schmitt v. Kurrus, 234 111.578,85 N.E. 261 (1908); Phelan v. Beswick, 213 Ore. 612,326 P.2d
1034 (1958), Norel v. Grochowski, 51 R.I. 376, 155 A. 357 (1931); Wilson v. Oldroyd, I Utah 2d 362,
267 P.2d 759 (1954); Goldsmith v. Joy, 61 Vt. 488, 17 A. 1010 (1889).
11. Compare the slight variations between the required state of mind in the following
jurisdictions: Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86 (1897) (requires evil motive, actual malice, deliberate
violence, or oppression); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (defendant's conduct
must be wanton, gross and outrageous, or malicious); Harrington v. Hadden, 69 Idaho 22,24,202 P.2d
236,237 (1949); Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657,662 (Iowa 1971); Fossv. MaineTurnpike Auth., 309
A.2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973) (the conduct of the defendant must be deliberate, malicious, or grossly
negligent); Smithhisler v. Dutter, 157 Ohio St. 454,459, 105 N.E.2d 868, 871 (1952) (a defendant must
act with malice, fraud, or insult).
12. Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Shephard, 215 Ala. 316, 110 So. 604 (1926); Fisher v. City of
Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Smith v. Hill, 12111. 2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958); City of Gary v,
Falcone, 348 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971);
Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 126 NYW 554 (1910).
13. Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Shephard, 215 Ala. 316, 110 So. 604 (1926); Chapin v. Tampoorlos,
325 Il. App. 219, 59 N.E.2d 334 (1945); Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978);
Hodges v. Hall, 172 N.C. 29,89 S.E. 802 (1916); Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277 (1859); Wilson v.
OIdroyd, I Utah 2d 362,267 P.2d 759 (1954); Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52,126
N.W. 554 (1910).
14. Ress v. Rediess, 130 Colo. 572, 278 P.2d 183 (1954); Shore v. Shore, 11 Kan. 101, 205 P,
1027 (1922); Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335,70 S.W. 878 (1902);
Gilham v. Devereaux, 67 Mont. 75, 214 P. 606 (1923).
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to recover exemplary damages, he has no cause of action at all.'115
Although many jurisdictions require that the amount of punitive damages
be reasonably related to the amount of compensatory damages awarded, 16
this limitation is inconsistent with the theory that the amount of punitive
damages is to be determined by the aggravation of the defendant's
conduct, and can be viewed as an attempt to limit the amount of punitive
damage awards. The rule, however, has not been strictly followed in those
jurisdictions in which it is used, 7 and some jurisdictions do not use it at
all. 18
B. Origin and Justification
Punitive damages arose relatively late in the common law. It is
difficult to isolate the precise date of their origin because courts often
permitted damages, seemingly in excess of actual damages, without
explaining their justification. As early as 1763, however, in Wilkes v.
Wood,'9 the court made it clear that to punish the defendant for wrongful
trespass and false arrest, it would allow an award of damages greater than
those required to cover actual injury to the plaintiff:
[A] jury have [sic] it in their power to give damages for more than the injury
received. Damages are defigned [sic] not only as a satisfaction to the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such
proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the
action itself.
20
Courts have typically chosen among four theories to justify awards of
punitive damages: protection of the public peace, compensation,
punishment, and deterrence. Under the first theory-protection of the
public peace-plaintiffs have been permitted to vindicate their rights in
court beyond compensation for actual injury as a method of deterring
violent acts on the streets.' It is questionable, however, whether an interest
to profit from the punishment of another should be encouraged by the
law,22 and the justification is rarely used today.
The second theory supporting the award of punitive damages arose
from the failure of courts to adequately compensate plaintiffs for damages
that were seemingly incapable of being measured or, by rule of law, were
15. Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335, 344,70 S.W. 878,880
(1902).
16. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (1931); Comment,
Municipal Tort I'abilityfor Punitive Damages, 1975-1976 TOL. L. REv. 624, 639.
17. Morris, supra note 16, at 1182 n.ll.
18. Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1973).
19. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
20. Id. at 498-99 (emphasis in original).
21. Winkler v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 66 N.J. Super. 22, 168 A.2d 418 (1961);
Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761,761 (C.P. 1814) ("It goes to prevent the practice of duelling, if
juries are permitted to punish insult by exemplary damages").
22. Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220,6 S.E.485 (1888); Note, Exemplary Danzagesin the Lawof
Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv 517, 522 (1957); Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against An
Entrepreneur for Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L. J. 1296, 1298 (1961).
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not compensated at all.23 Therefore, punitive damages were awarded to
compensate plaintiffs for mental anguish,2 4 wounded dignity,25  or
attorney's fees. 26 Today, however, because of the increasing acceptance of
intangible injuries as worthy of compensation,27 this justification for
punitive damages has been frequently criticized28 and is rarely used.
Connecticut 29 limits punitive damages to the amount of attorney's fees, so
that they are in reality a type of compensatory damages, while in
Michigan,30 the term "punitive damages" is used solely to describe a type of
compensatory damages. One authority has suggested that if a jurisdiction
uses the term "punitive damages" to describe what is actually a
compensatory measurement, the name should be changed to "compen-
satory damages" to avoid undue confusion.3'
Today, punitive damages are most frequently justified by the third
and fourth theories-punishment of the offender and deterrence to him
and others from similar wrongdoings.32 Therefore, their award is only
permitted when the wrongdoer acted with ill-will, recklessness, spite, or
malice rising to a level generally punishable by criminal law.33 Only then is
a defendant deserving of such punishment in civil proceedings.
C. Criticism
Even though in most states punitive damages are permitted in some
form,34 they are not favored in the law, and have been frequently criti-
cized. Many critics contend that, because the law of torts is based upon
compensation and the criminal law deals with punishing offenders,
punItive damages are an unjust windfall to the civil plaintiff.35 As the court
in Fay v. Parker36 emotionally stated:
23. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851); Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine
Which Should Be Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AOAINST PUNITIVE DAMAOIES
4 (1969); Belli, supra note 8, at 42.
24. Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351 (1885); Belli, supra note 8, at 421
Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870 (1976).
25. Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351 (1885); Tullidge v. Wade, 3
Wilson K.B. 18, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (1769); Long, supra note 24, at 873.
26. Belli, supra note 8, at 42.
27. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); Duffy, supra note 23; Ilelli, supra note 8, at 42.
28. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541,5 P. 119 (1884); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 16 Am. Rep, 270
(1873); Bass v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877); Duffy, supra note 23, at 5.
29. Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930).
30. Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922). See Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich,
App. 702, 242 N.W.2d 494 (1976), for a discussion of the punitive damages theory in Michigan, and
how it is applied in suits against municipalities.
31. Duffy, supra note 23, at 7.
32. W. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77 (1935); RESTATI:MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908. Comment a (1979); Note, 70 HARV. L. REV., supra note 22, at 520; Belli, supra note 8, at
40.
33. See cases cited in note I I supra.
34. For states not recognizing punitive damages, see note 6 supra.
35. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541,5 P. 119 (1884); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Guard, 283 Ky.
187, 139 S.W.2d 722 (1940); Bass v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654 (1877); Duffy, supra note 23,
at 7; Belli, supra note 8, at 40.
36. 53 N.H. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1873).
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What is a civil remedy but reparation for a wrong inflicted, to the injury
of the party seeking redress,-compensation for damage sustained by the
plaintiff? How could the idea of punishment be deliberately and designedly
installed as a doctrine of civil remedies? Is not punishment out of place,
irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to say absurd and
ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies? What kind of a civil remedy
for the plaintiff is the punishment of the defendant? The idea is wrong. It is
monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming
the symmetry of the body of the law.
3
"
It is argued that, in criminal law, an experienced judge determines the
amount of the fine, but in civil proceedings, juries, who can easily be
overwhelmed by the defendant's outrageous conduct, must decide what
amount will adequately punish the defendant. Awards by juries are
frequently higher than a criminal fine would have been had the defendant
been prosecuted.38
This criticism is especially pronounced in the areas of product liability
and mass disaster cases, in which a defendant could be liable to many
plaintiffs for the same wrongdoing. Not only is the award of punitive
damages unfair to the defendant in these circumstances-for he is
punished multiple times for the same act-but it is also unfair to
subsequent plaintiffs, whose compensatory damage awards may be
uncollectable due to prior depletion of the defendant's financial resources
by punitive awards.39
Although it has never been successfully argued in the United States
Supreme Court, a few commentators and lower courts contend that
punitive damages are unconstitutional. Since these damages most
frequently serve the purpose of punishment and deterrence, they are in
effect quasi-criminal.40 Often when an offender is liable for punitive
damages, he is potentially liable for criminal prosecution as well 4' and
most jurisdictions permit a punitive damage award in addition to a
criminal penalty.42 Thus, it is argued that punitive damages constitute a
criminal penalty without such constitutional protections as double
jeopardy, self-incrimination, burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
and unanimity of jurors,43 and therefore they violate the fifth and sixth
37. Id. at 382, 16 Am. Rep. at 319-20 (emphasis in original).
38. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832,839 (2d Cir. 1967) (FriendlyJ.); Ford,
The Constitutionality of Punitive Danzagei; in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Tim CASE AGAINST
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15, 18 (1969); Note, 70 HARV. L. REv., supra note 22, at 530.
39. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.).
40. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Cohen v. Peoples, 140 Ind. App. 353,220
N.E.2d 665 (1966); Dhffy, supra note 23, at 10. See gehirally Ford, supra note 38.
41. Ford, supra note 38, at 15-16.
42. Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271,135 A.2d 657 (1957); Smithhislerv. Dutter, 157 Ohio St.454,
105 N.E.2d 868 (1952); Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502,191 S.W.2d 562 (1945). Contra, Schafer v.
Smith, 63 Ind. 226 (1878) (punitive damages not permitted if a defendant is potentially liable in
criminal law for the same offense.)
43. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541,5 P. 119 (1884); Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68,30 Am. Rep. 814
(1878); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1873); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2
Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891); Jones v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969); Duffy, supra
note 23; Ford, supra note 38, at 15.
1979]
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amendments of the United States Constitution. As one commentator
remarked:
Punitive damages are assessed against a defendant in order to accomplish the
traditional criminal law objectives of punishment and deterrence. The
substantive effects of many punitive damages awards are as oppressive as
criminal punishment. The only discernable difference between a sizable
award of punitive damages and a short jail sentence or criminal fine is the
descriptive label employed. But resort to facile labeling is not a responsiblejudicial method of insuring fairness and due process; of law in judicial
proceedings. When such superficial distinctions are made, substantial
pecuniary interests and property interests cannot find adequate con-
stitutional protection from abuse and unwarranted interference.
It is also tenable that the use of the defendant's wealth as a criterion for
computing damages violates the equal protection clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments; the wealthier one is, the more he must pay for the
same conduct.4
5
In support of punitive damages, it is argued that they benefit society
by punishing those who should be punished by the criminal law, but whose
conduct is overlooked by the prosecutors. 6 Perhaps, :instead, our criminal
justice system needs to be overhauled to prevent this blurring of the
purposes of civil and criminal law. Punitive damages are viewed by
supporters as a private remedy rather than as a criminal one,47 and
therefore constitutional arguments lose their validity, Moreover, one
authority contends that the purpose of tort law is to punish the defendant,
as well as to compensate the plaintiff, and punitive damages aid in reaching
the punishment goal .
The double jeopardy criticism is weakened in Indiana where, if it is
possible that a defendant will be prosecuted for the same offense, an award
of punitive damages is withheld.49 In several other jurisdictions, evidence
of a prior criminal conviction may be used in mitigation of the punitive
damage award. 0 This does not, however, console the defendant who is
prosecuted after being held liable for punitive damages in a civil suit.
The principles and policies concerning municipal liability for punitive
damages must be considered in light of this criticism of punitive damages
in general.
D. Punitive Damage Awards Against Municipalities
In the absence of a statute permitting the award of punitive damages
44. Ford, supra note 38, at 19.
45. See id.
46. MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 276.
47. Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 135 A.2d 657 (1957); Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27 App.
Div. 2d 112, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1967); Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945).
48. Morris, supra note 16, at 1177.
49. Schafer v. Smith, 63 Ind. 226 (1878).
50. Albrecht v. Walker, 73 111. 69 (1874); Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463,72 S.E. 610 (1911);
Wirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 8, 70 A. 906 (1908).
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against a municipal corporation, the overwhelming majority of states
refuse to award these damages.5' This doctrine restricting punitive
damages has also been applied against non-municipality defendants who
are so related to the municipality that they merit the same protection.
5 2
When the issue of punitive damages against a municipality arises, the
indication is that either the jurisdiction has joined the majority of states
and abrogated or modified municipal common-law immunity in tort, 3 or
that the case arises under a proprietary function of the municipality's
operation and thus no common-law immunity exists.5 4 It is generally
agreed, however, that the municipality retains an absolute immunity for
acts or omissions of their employees that are discretionary or at a planning
or policy level,55 and therefore the issue of punitive damages would not
arise.
Perhaps the first case in the United States to discuss the issue of
awarding punitive damages against a municipality was Whipple v.
Walpole,56 an 1839 case that alleged gross negligence in the city's failure to
repair a bridge. The New Hampshire Supreme Court permitted an award
of punitive damages against the municipality in order to deter the city from
such negligence in the future. Woodman v. Nottingham,57 however,
expressly overruled Whipple and held that punitive damages were never
51. See cases cited in note 2 supra.
52. Urban Renewal Agency v. Tackett, 255 So. 2d 904 (Miss. 1971).
53. Some courts have judicially abrogated the common-law immunity of municipalities in tort
cases: Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963); Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n,
93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239,429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Evansv. Board
of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97,482 P.2d 968 (1971); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d
130 (Fla. 1957); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970); Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968; Brinkman v. City of
Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738
(Ky. 1964); Williamsv. City of Detroit,364 Mich. 23 1, 111 N.W.2d 1 (196 1), as interpretedinSherbutte
v. Marine City, 374 Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920 (1964); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist.,264 Minn.
279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968); Willis .
Department of Conservation and Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534,264 A.2d 34 (1970); Ayala v. Philadelphia
Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562,261 A.2d 896
(1970); Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962); Long v. City of Weirton, 214
S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975), while other states have statutorily abrogated in whole, or in part, the
common-law immunity. Jahnke v. Incorporated City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.2d 780 (Iowa 1971);
Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945); Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402
P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1965).
54. Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U.S. 650 (1921); McSheridan v. City ofTaladega, 243
Ala. 162,8 So. 2d 831 (1942); Davoustv. City ofAlameda, 149 Cal. 69,84 P.760(1906); Updike%. City
of Omaha, 87 Neb. 228,127 N.W. 229 (1910); Brown v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302,243 P.2d 609
(1952); Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842); Nanna v. Village of McArthur, 44 Ohio
App. 2d 22, 335 N.E.2d 712 (1974). But see Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228
(1911) (holding that in South Carolina there is no distinction made between proprietary and
governmental functions of a municipality, instead, there is no common law liability at all against
municipal corporations).
55. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239,429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211,359 P.2d 457 (1961); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Spanel
v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash.
2d 882, 410 P.2d 606 (1966).
56. 10 N.H. 130 (1839).
57. 49 N.H. 387, 6 Am. Rep. 526 (1870).
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permitted against a municipality because the required malice was too
difficult to prove.58
Although there was some authority, even before Young v. City of Des
Moines, expressly permitting punitive damage , awards against
municipalities, the majority viewpoint denying such relief has remained
strong. Several courts, however, while rejecting an award of punitive
damages against a municipality in the case before them, haye hinted that
they might approve such an award under more stringent conditions."
Those conditions, however, are so strict that no subsequent case in the
respective jurisdictions has permitted an award of punitive damages
against a municipality. An increasing number of states, on the other hand,
are adopting or restating the majority viewpoint that denies punitive
damages against a municipality. Two recent cases went so far as to overrule
past cases in adopting the majority position. In Nixon v. Oklahoma," the
court held that punitive damages were never to be permitted against a
municipality and disapproved two prior cases that had implied that these
damages may sometimes be appropriate. A nuisance case in Missouri6'
that had actually permitted punitive damages against a city was
subsequently overruled by one of the strongest opinions written espousing
the majority rule.62
II. YOUNG v. CITY OF DEs MOINES
A. Facts and Holding
Despite this overwhelming support for the majority rule, the Supreme
Court of Iowa in Young permitted an award of punitive damages against
the city of Des Moines.63 The plaintiff alleged that his warrantless arrest for
intoxication was illegal because he was not intoxicated at the time of the
arrest. 64 The city failed to offer proof whether the plaintiff actually was
intoxicated, 65 and the legal question was therefore whether a misdemeanor
must in fact have been committed before a warrantless arrest is legal.66 The
58. Id. at 394, 6 Am. Rep. at 532.
59. Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C. 1975) ("absent extraordinary
circumstances not present here"); City of Chicago v. Kelly, 69111.475,477 (1873) (punitive damages are
only permitted when the injury was willful, which is "scarcely possible" against municipal
corporations); City of Parsons v. Lindsay, 26 Kan. 426 (1881) (negligence must be so gross as to
amount to wantonness); City of Covington v. Faulhaber, 177 Ky. 623, 197 S.W. 1065 (1917) (required
more malice than for an ordinary defendant); Willet v. Village of Saint Albans, 69 Vt. 330, 38 A, 72
(1897) (award proper only if the municipal corporation authorizes or ratifies the wrongful conduct
through the trustees of the corporation).
60. 555 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1976).
61. Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935).
62. Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968).
63. 262 N.W.2d 612, 622 (Iowa 1978).
64. Id. at 614.
65. Id. at 614-15.
66. Id. at 615.
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trial resulted in a judgment against the city. Only compensatory damages
were awarded, however, because the court held as a matter of law that
punitive damages were not recoverable from a municipality. The city
appealed to the Supreme Court of Iowa, claiming that the judge had
improperly instructed the jury on the issue of false arrest.67 Young cross-
appealed requesting punitive damages in addition to the compensatory
award. 68 The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the trial court on both
issues, holding that a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor is proper when
a police officer has probable cause to believe it is occurring in his
presence, 69 and that a punitive damage award should have been permitted
against the city.70 An earlier case, Bennett v. Cit' of Marion,7 which had
denied punitive damages against municipalities, was distinguished because
it had been decided during a time when punitive damages were not favored
against any defendant and before the trend toward abrogation of
common-law municipal immunity.72
The Young court justified its decision on grounds of social policy as
well as legislative intent. It recognized that the majority of states fear that
punitive damage awards against a municipality would overburden a city's
treasury,73 and that the deterrence and punishment functions of punitive
damages are not served when awarded against a municipality.7 4 The
Young court argued against these and other policy considerations and
upheld the award of punitive damages against Des Moines on statutory
grounds. The Iowa statute75 abrogating the immunity municipalities
enjoyed at common law is silent with respect to punitive damages, but the
court in Young interpreted it as permitting punitive damages awards
against municipalities.76 Although the court's allowance of such awards
can be justified on the basis of legislative intent, its discussion of the policy
reasons in support of the decision comes dangerously close to concluding
that, even without legislative sanction, the better rule would be to allow
punitive damages against a municipal defendant. It is necessary, therefore,
to examine both the policy rationale and the legislative interpretation of
the court in the Young case.
67. Id. at 614.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 619.
70. Id. at 622.
71. 102 Iowa 425, 71 N.W. 360 (1897).
72. 262 N.W.2d at 220.
73. Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So.2d
455 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968); Rannells %,. City of
Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975).
74. 262 N.W.2d at 621.
75. "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, every municipality is subject to liability for its
torts and those of its officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment or
duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." 41 Iowva CODE ANN. § 613A.2
(West Supp. 1979).
76. 262 N.W.2d at 222.
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B. Critique
1. Policy Considerations
The court in Young discussed and rejected many of the arguments in
support of the rule disallowing punitive damages against a municipality. It
has been argued that, because the amount of a punitive damage award
increases with the wealth of the defendant," if evidence of a city's
unlimited taxing power were introduced, the city could theoretically be
burdened by an overwhelming award. 78 The court in Young did not
consider such a theoretical possibility to be an obstacle to awards of
punitive damages, but instead maintained that a municipality's ability to
pay for punitive damages would be admissible as evidence and the jury
would allocate an amount that was appropriate. This contention, however,
fails to confront the issue of the enormous wealth potential of a
municipality through its taxing power. Awards would necessarily be high
if the municipality is to be adequately punished. Moreover, the amount
that would punish the municipality may be too difficult to determine. 79 For
example, if the claim is for wrongdoing of an employee whose job was
related to a proprietary function of the municipality, such as negligence in
the maintenance of a sewer, the wealth of the sewage plant alone could
perhaps be considered in determining the amount of punitive damages to
award. This would only be effective as punishment if the sewage plant then
lost funds equal to the punitive damage award from its operating expenses.
More likely, the city treasury will pay the award and all functions of the
municipality would suffer equally, but only to a slight degree because the
sewage plant's wealth alone was determinative of the award. If the
wrongdoing arose from a governmental function such as false arrest by a
police official, the same problem would arise. In both situations, if the
entire municipality's wealth were considered, and punitive damages
awarded on that basis, the department from which the wrongdoing arose
would theoretically be indirectly reprimanded, not through loss of funds,
but because the top officials will become so distressed by the award that
they will instigate new procedures to avoid the wrongdoing. If, however,
the entire wealth of the municipality is considered, the award against the
municipality could be unjustly crippling to many innocent departments of
the municipality.
It has been suggested by several commentators that punitive damages
will be constrained by the general principle that a punitive award need bear
a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages awarded.80 This
reasonable ratio rate, however, is not followed in all jurisdictions,8I nor in
77. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
78. See cases cited in note 73 supra.
79. City of Gary v. Falcone, 348 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).




Iowa,8 2 and those jurisdictions that claim they do recognize it frequently
permit extremely disproportionate awards.83 Cases calling for punitive
damages are generally those with outrageous wrongdoings that arouse the
sympathies of the jury,84 and therefore punitive awards are large.
Furthermore, if the reasonable ratio rule is followed, the amount of
damages awarded would not be controlled by the amount that would
adequately punish the defendant and, thus, the punitive function of the
award would remain unsatisfied8 5
The court in Young also considered the contention that the most
commonly cited theories supporting punitive damages, that is, punishment
and deterrence, are not fulfilled when punitive damages are permitted
against a municipality. 6 The majority of states that disallow punitive
damages against municipalities maintain that the taxpayers are innocent
of direct wrongdoing, yet would bear the burden of satisfying the punitive
damage award. 7 Although the wrongdoer himself should be responsible
for a punitive award, it would be rare that a municipal employee would
have sufficient financial resources to bear this burden. 8 Consequently, the
innocent taxpayers would ultimately pay for the awards. Furthermore, the
Young court failed to confront the strongest argument in support of the
majority viewpoint. The purpose of punishing an offender is to benefit the
members of society; however, the taxpayers are paying for this benefit
themselves.3 9 This ironical consequence does not occur with any other
defendant.
A similar argument is made concerning the deterrent function of
punitive damages. If a municipality is liable vicariously, there is no
wrongdoing to be deterred. The wrongdoing employee will not be deterred
either, because he will probably not be able to pay the award.90 Moreover,
it is assumed that municipal officials will punish their errant employees
even in the absence of a punitive damage award.9' The wrongdoing itself,
82. Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1973).
83. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
84. Beli, supra note 8, at 43.
85. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423
S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968).
86. See 262 N.W.2d at 621.
87. Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975); Fisherv. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d
455 (Fla. 1965); City of Gary v. Falcone, 348 N.E. 2d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); M'Gary v. President of
Lafayette, 12 Rob. 674,43 Am. Dec. 239 (La. 1846); Foss v. MaineTurnpike Auth.,309 A.2d 339 (Me.
1973); Town ofNewton v. Wilson, 128 Miss. 726,91 So. 419 (1922); Chappell v. City ofSpringfield,423
S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968); Brown v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1952); Rannells v.
City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1,321 N.E.2d 885 (1975); Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283
(Okla. 1976).
88. Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975); Fisherv. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d
455 (Fla. 1965); City of Gary v. Falcone, 348 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
89. See cases cited in note 87 supra.
90. See cases cited in note 88 supra.
91. Smithy. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975); Fisherv. City ofMiami, 172So. 2d
455 (Fla. 1965); City of Gary v. Falcone, 348 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Chappell v. City of
Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968).
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as well as the compensatory damages, are considered an adequate spur.
The court in Young, dismissed these policy justifications in support of
the majority viewpoint because similar arguments had been rejected with
respect to private corporations.92 Although private corporations are
generally liable for punitive damages for the actions of their employees,
this liability has caused debate for over one hundred years. Many
jurisdictions permit punitive damage awards against a private corpora-
tion, even though there was no fault on the part of the corporation or its
top level officials, provided that the offender was acting within the scope of
his employment. 93 The Supreme Court of Iowa has adopted this
viewpoint. 94 There has been growing acceptance, however, of the theory
that before a private corporation can be held liable for punitive damages,
the corporation or its high level officials must have authorized, ratified, or
participated in the wrongdoing or hired an unfit employee. 95
Most of the arguments that support disallowance of punitive damages
against a municipality also apply when such damages are permitted
vicariously against a private corporation; but even if punitive damages are
allowed against a private corporation, there are additional reasons to
disallow them against municipalities. Suits against municipalities, unlike
those against private corporations, have not found the presence of
authorization or ratification to be a prerequisite for punitive damages. The
majority of states that forbid punitive damages against a municipality
forbid them under all circumstances.96 In Young, the court failed to discuss
whether the municipality had ratified or authorized the policeman's
conduct; presumably, therefore, a municipality in Iowa is to be liable
under either circumstance.
Theoretically, if either high officials or the taxpayers themselves ratify
or authorize the wrongdoing, or hire unfit employees, there is active fault
that may deserve punitive damages. In City of Lawton v. Johnston,97
which has subsequently been disapproved, 98 the court in dicta supported
awards of punitive damages if the taxpayers acquiesced in the aggravated
conduct. Another case,99 although no longer of precedential value,
100
92. 262 N.W.2d at 621.
93. Kelite Products, Inc. v. Binzel, 224 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1955); Western Coach Corp. v.
Vaughn, 9 Ariz. 336, 452 P.2d 117 (1969); Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246,210 S.W.2d 293 (1948),
Alexander v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 327 So. 2d 860 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1976); Goddard v,
Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869); Hairston v. Ati. Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 642,18 S,E2d 166
(1942); Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 271 Or. 430, 532 P.2d 790 (1975). See also Morris, supra
note 16, at 1201.
94. Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1973).
95. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Fort v. White, 530 F.2d
1113 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying Connecticut law); Parris v. Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc., 395 F,2d 543
(2d Cir. 1968) (applying Vermont law); Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1923); Security
Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman Assoc., Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 137, 260 A,2d 248 (1970).
96. See cases cited in note 2 supra.
97. 123 Okla. 145, 252 P. 393 (1926).
98. Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1976).
99. St. John's Gas Co. v. City of San Juan, I P.R. Fed. 160 (1902).
100. See Cooperative de Seguros Multiples v. San Juan, 289 F. Supp. 858 (D.P.R. 1968)
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illustrates what ratification by the taxpayers entails. The mayor had
wrongfully taken control of a private gas company, and the court held the
municipality liable for punitive damages because they received the benefit
from the mayor's acts.1°'
Taxpayers as a whole, however, would rarely be guilty of expressly
authorizing municipal employees to engage in aggravated conduct, and it
is unjust to hold taxpayers liable for punitive damages for merely receiving
a benefit from the wrongdoing. Passive acquiescence in conduct does not
rise to the aggravated level meriting punitive damages. Moreover, it is
often argued that taxpayers, as contrasted to stockholders,1°2 can do little
to control the acts of employees.10 3 If a wrongdoing municipal employee is
not an elected official, the taxpayers have no direct control over his
conduct and no opportunity to replace him. If the employee is in an elected
position, the taxpayers have an opportunity to vote him from office, but no
additional control over his conduct. In reality, stockholders may have
equally limited control over the selection and conduct of employees. They
typically elect the Board of Directors, which is responsible indirectly for
management of the corporation. This similarity alone, however, does not
compel the conclusion that municipalities and private corporations be
treated alike.
It can be argued that the taxpayers are indirectly responsible for the
position each municipal employee occupies; either they directly elected
him, or an official that they elected directly or indirectly selected him and
therefore the taxpayers should be liable for each employee's misconduct.
This may be an appropriate justification for allowing a plaintiff to be
compensated by a municipality, but not for allowing punitive damages. A
plaintiff who has been injured should not be prejudiced by losing a right to
be compensated, but because punitive damages are not awarded as of
right,10 4 and are a windfall to the plaintiff'0 5 for the benefit of others, there
is no prejudice to plaintiffs who fail to receive punitive damages from a
municipal defendant. Therefore, because the taxpayers lack control over
municipal employees, and because no injustice occurs by denying a
plaintiff a punitive damage award, a municipality should not be burdened
with punitive damages when the taxpayers have merely ratified a
municipal employee's misconduct.
It is more difficult to support the disallowance of punitive damages
when the top officials of a municipality, as opposed to the taxpayers, have
authorized, ratified, or participated in the misconduct or hired an unfit
employee. Young maintained that if municipalities are liable for punitive
(explaining that punitive damages are not permitted in Puerto Rico against any defendant, because
civil law jurisdictions do not recognize the doctrine).
101. 1 P.R. Fed. at 163.
102. Rannells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975), citing Costich v.
City of Rochester, 68 App. Div. 623, 73 N.Y.S. 835 (1902).
103. Id.; Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1976).
104. See cases cited in note 12 supra.
105. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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damages, officials, who have to answer to the public at election time, will be
more careful in their selection of employees. 0 6 If there is no allegation of
improper hiring, however, or other wrongdoing of municipal officials, it is
unjust, as well as impractical, to impose such harsh burdens on the
municipality. The officials are innocent, and there is no wrongdoing to
deter.
If, however, an official is responsible for hiring an unfit employee, the
pressure from his supervisors and the public may, as Young suggests,
induce more careful hiring of'employees. If the official is guilty of ratifying
or authorizing the misconduct, an award of punitive damages against the
municipality may encourage that department to develop more stringent
standards of conduct. If the official at fault is not in an elected position,
however, it is unjust to punish the taxpayers for conduct for which they are
not responsible. Moreover, the taxpayers may have equally tenuous
control over an elected official who is at fault for either hiring an unfit
employee or ratifying or participating in the wrongdoing. By the time a
judgment has been reached, the official's term in office may have expired.
Therefore, the taxpayers are overwhelmed by a large award, and cannot
show their dissatisfaction by replacing the responsible official. Admittedly,
if the official does remain in office until the punitive damages are awarded,
rejecting him at the polls would not only terminate the immediate problem
but would deter those filling his position from similar misconduct. This is
analogous to the situation of a private corporation. If the corporate official
guilty of ratification, authorization, or negligent hiring is fired or
reprimanded because of the punitive damage award, he and others will be
deterred from wrongdoing in the future.
Even though, theoretically, there is at least one circumstance in which
an award of punitive damages could deter the misconduct of municipal
employees, there are important considerations that justify the majority
viewpoint that disallows punitive damages against a municipality. Puni-
tive damages in general are to benefit society by punishing wrongdoers and
deterring them and others from participating in similar misconduct. In a
private corporation, the shareholders, even if innocent of direct
wrongdoing, must suffer the penalty of punitive damages in order to
benefit the entire community. When punitive damages are permitted
against a municipality, however, the taxpayers who are to benefit from the
punishment bear the cost of the award. This wasted money could be better
justified if the award were channeled into state or municipal treasuries to
support the implementation of stricter employee selection standards, and
if departmental regulations were implemented to help prevent future
wrongdoing. Instead, the plaintiff, who has also received compensation for
his actual injuries, reaps an unnecessary windfall at the cost of the
taxpayer. This is true in all suits against a municipality, regardless of
106. 262 N.W.2d at 621-22.
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whether there has been active fault by the top officials. Furthermore,
punitive damages are not essential because the publicity of the
wrongdoing, together with the compensatory damage award, serve to
deter future wrongdoing. In addition, it is frequently maintained that one
cannot be found vicariously guilty in a criminal suit, 0 7 because to penalize
one who is not personally guilty is both unjust and serves no deterrent
purpose.' 8 Punitive damage awards against a municipality are similarly
an unjust and useless penalty when the municipality is held vicariously
liable in a civil action:
The distinction between respondeat superior in tort law and its application to
the criminal law is obvious. In tort law the doctrine is employed for the
purpose of settling the incidence of loss upon the party who can best bear such
loss. But the criminal law is supported by totally different concepts. We
impose penal treatment upon those who injure or menace social interests,
partly in order to reform, partly to prevent the continuation of the anti-
social activity and partly to deter others. If a defendant has personally lived
up to the social standards of the criminal law and has not menaced or injured
anyone, why impose penal treatment?10 9
In view of the criticism directed at punitive damages when awarded
vicariously or against a municipality, as well as against punitive damages
in general, the majority rule should prevail; absent a statute authorizing
punitive damages, there should be none awarded against a municipality.
2. Statutory Interpretation
Although the court in Young thoroughly discussed and rejected the
policy reasons that have persuaded other courts to disallow punitive
damage awards against municipalities, its holding was primarily based on
an interpretation of the Iowa statute' ° that removed the common-law
immunity of municipalities. Although the statute did not specifically refer
to punitive damages, the court concluded that it"removes all common law
tort immunity previously accorded municipalities .. . ."" The court
stated further that "there is presently nothing which suggests the general
assembly intended to prohibit assessment of punitive damages against
governmental subdivisions. ' 12 The court also felt that its conclusion was
buttressed by the State Tort Claims Act,"' which preceded the statute in
107. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959) (no vicarious criminal
liability unless a statute permits it for purely regulatory interests that are noncriminal and do not relate
to questions of wrongdoing or guilt). See particularly Judge Musmanno's dissenting opinion, id. at
588, 155 A.2d at 831. But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Oito REv.
CODE ANN. § 2901.23 (Page 1975) (imposing some organizational liability upon corporations, but
specifically excluding governmental entities).
108. See generally Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HAgv. L Rav. 517 (1957).
109. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 580, 155 A.2d 825, 827 n.1 (1959).
110. 41 IowA CODE ANN. § 613A.2 (West Supp. 1979); see note 75 supra for the relevant text of
the statute.
111. 262 N.W.2d at 622.
112. Id.
113. "The State shall be liable in respect to such claims to the same claimants, in the same
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question and expressly precluded punitive damages against the state. The
court maintained that the "failure to include a like immunity for municipal
corporations can scarcely be attributed to inadvertence or oversight"' 
1 4
and that the legislature must have intended to permit punitive damages
against a municipality.
This inconsistency between the statutes abrogating state and
municipal immunity, however, is not as indicative of legislative intent as
the court suggested. The Federal Tort Claims Act,1 5 which specifically
proscribes punitive damages, was used as a model by the Iowa legislature
in enacting the State Tort Claims Act." 6 It could be argued that the
municipality statute should be interpreted to preclude punitive damages
because it was patterned after both the state and the federal act, which
preclude such damages, and that the legislature would have expressly
included punitive damages if that different result had been desired. The
fact that the later statute referring to municipal liability is silent on the
issue of punitive damages is no more suggestive that the legislature
specifically intended to allow them than it is an indication that they
intended to preclude them. Moreover, it is difficult to defend ajustification
that would encourage a legislature to permit punitive damages against a
municipality, but not against a state. The court in Young seemed to be
persuaded by the fact that it could find no policy reason why municipalities
and private corporations should be treated differently with respect to
liability for punitive damages. " 7 An even stronger argument, however, can
be made that there is no justification for deciding that local governments
are liable for punitive damages while the state government is not.
As stated above," 8 the court in Young reasoned that, without express
provision to the contrary, the Iowa statute removing common-law tort
immunity must be read as also abolishing immunity from punitive
damages. The general rule, however, has been to interpret strictly statutes
that would possibly permit punitive damages against a municipality. 119
Therefore, if a statute allowed treble damages against any defendant,
treble damages against a municipality have been precluded.2 Statutes
such as the one interpreted in the Young case, which permit a tort action
manner, and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, except that the state
shallnot be liable for interest prior to judgment orforpunitive damages." 3A IOWA CODE ANN §25A.4
(West 1978) (emphasis added).
114. 262 N.W.2d at 622.
115. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
116. 3A IOWA CODE ANN. § 25A.4 (West 1978). See note 113 supra for the relevant text of the
statute.
117. 262 N.W.2d at 622.
118. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
119. See cases cited in notes 120-21 infra.
120. Desforge v. City of West St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42 N.W.2d 633 (1950); Hunt v. City of
Boonville, 65 Mo. 620, 27 Am. Rep. 299 (1877).
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against a municipality but are silent with respect to punitive damages, have
been interpreted as not condoning them against a municipality.,2
There are two cases that recently avoided this general rule of strict
interpretation and permitted punitive damages against a municipality, but
neither was discussed in Young on the issue of statutory interpretation. In
Pennsylvania, a federal district court held, in a case of first impression, that
a Pennsylvania court would allow punitive damages against the municipal
defendant. 122 The court contended that a Philadelphia ordinance, 23 which
permitted suits against the city "in accordance with the same rules oflaw as
applied by the Courts of this Commonwealth against any other part)
defendant,"'24 was to be interpreted broadly to include punitive damage
awards. There was no discussion of the policy arguments against such
awards. No other Pennsylvania case has been found that further considers
this issue.
New York's position on the issue of punitive damages is rather
unclear. In Costich v. City of Rochester,125 the court made an emphatic
argument against all punitive damage awards to municipalities. That case,
however, was decided before the enactment of the State Court of Claims
Act,126 which was interpreted to extend liability for damages to
muiicipalities as well as the state. 27 Fifty-six years after Costich, the same
court that had decided Costich stated, in Raplee v. City of Corning,12 8 that
whether punitive damages were allowed against municipalities was "not
free from doubt."' 29 Then, in Hayes v. State, 30 the New York Court of
Claims, holding that punitive damage awards were permitted against the
state, stated in dicta that such awards against municipalities could also be
sustained. The court of claims maintained that the State Court of Claims
Act,' 31 which permits damages against the state as if it were an individual
or corporation, was evidence of the legislature's goal of allowing punitive
121. Burr v. Town of Plymouth, 48 Conn. 460 (1881); Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N.H. 387
(1870); Brown v. village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1952).
122. Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967), off'd, 400 F.2d 857 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969).
123. PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE ch. 21-700 (1962).
124. Id., quoted Ln Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667, 683 (1967) (emphasis
added by the Hennigan court).
125. 68 App. Div. 623, 73 N.Y.S. 835 (1902).
126. "The State hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes
liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied
to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations . . . " N.Y. JuD. LAw § 8
(McKinney 1963).
127. See discussion in Hayes v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 498,363 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Ct. Cl. 1975),revldon
other grounds, 50 App. Div. 2d 693, 376 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1975).
128. 6 App. Div. 2d 230, 176 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. App. Di. 1958).
129. Id. at 232, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
130. 80 Misc. 2d 498, 363 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Ct. Cl. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 50 App. Div. 2d
693, 376 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1975).
131. N.Y. JUD. LAWv § 8 (McKinney 1963).
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damages against the state or a municipality. Therefore, the court
contended that considerations of public policy were not necessary. The
most recent New York case'3 2 brought against a municipality avoided the
issue by refusing a punitive damage award on other grounds.
Both Pennsylvania and New York indicate that there may be a trend
toward relaxing the disallowance of punitive damages, especially when the
common-law municipal tort immunity has been statutorily, rather than
judicially, abrogated. The relevant laws in Pennsylvania and New York,
however, both explicitly require that a municipality's liability be
determined in the same manner used for "any other party defendant"133 or
"individual or corporation." 134 This language is to be contrasted with that
of the Iowa statute, which merely makes a municipality "subject to liability
for its torts .. ,. . Surely it is more reasonable to interpret the former
statutory schemes as contemplating punitive damage awards against
municipalities than it is the latter, especially in light of the strict
construction to be given these statutes. 136 In any event, a more definite
expression of the states' policies is required before either New York or
Pennsylvania can be cited as strong authority allowing punitive damages
against a municipality.
Although the court in Young relied partially upon legislative intent to
uphold the award of punitive damages against Des Moines, the court's
analysis is vulnerable. The court reasoned that the legislature consciously
omitted any reference to punitive damages so that they could be awarded
against a municipality and not the state. Yet what policy justification
would encourage a legislature to permit punitive damages against a
municipality, but not against the state? If the legislature did intend this
inconsistent result, it should have been forced to state so expressly in the
statute. The court should have been more reluctant to imply legislative
acquiescence to punitive damages because of the general rule that statutes
which possibly allow punitive damages must be interpreted strictly and
because, in arriving at its result, the court was forced to overrule a case
137
that, despite the fact that it was decided in 1897, had been used by many
courts to justify the disallowance of punitive damage awards against a
municipality.
138
There are recent decisions interpreting civil liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983'" 9 that may thwart the goals supporting disallowance of punitive
132. Kieninger v. City of New York, 53 App. Div. 2d 602, 384 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1976).
133. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 8 (McKinney 1963).
134. PHILADELPHIA,-PA. CODE ch. 21-700 (1962).
135. 41 IOWA CODE ANN. § 613A.2 (West Supp. 1979).
136. See text accompanying notes 123-25 supra.
137. Bennett v. City of Marion, 102 Iowa 425, 71 N.W. 360 (1897).
138. "See, e.g., Mayor of Americus v. Ansley, 14 Ga. App. 707,82 S.E. 159 (1914), Desforge v.
City of St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42 N.W.2d 633 (1950).
139.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, ofany
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damages against a municipality. In Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York, 40 the United States Supreme Court,
expressly overruling Monroe v. Pape,'4 1 held that municipalities are
"persons" within section 1983 and therefore are not immune from a section
1983 suit. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the
issue, several circuits have permitted punitive damage awards against
defendants in section 1983 actions. 42 The Court has indicated, however, in
a footnote in Carey v. Piphus,143 that it may allow punitive damages when
the requisite malice is present. Therefore, potential tort claims suits in the
state courts could be brought as section 1983 actions so that punitive
damages could be recovered. The Court in Monell, however, limited the
situations under which a municipality could be sued in section 1983 ac-
tions:
We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under §
1983 for injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983 .. . .[W]e have no occasion to address, and do not address, what the
full contours of municipal liability under § 1983 may be.'"
If this language is interpreted broadly, so that many plaintiffs are able
to avoid the disallowance of punitive damages in state tort suits by utilizing
section 1983, the majority viewpoint must be reconsidered to determine if
the negative aspects of such "cause of action" shopping outweigh the policy
considerations supporting disallowances of. punitive damages.
III. CONCLUSION
Neither the policy nor the legislative intent rationales advanced by the
Young Court are convincing and, therefore, the court's holding should not
be utilized by other jurisdictions to permit awards of punitive damages
against a municipality. The court, although commendably attempting to
"deter unfounded and oppressive peace officer conduct under the guise of
official action,"'145 ignored the principal justification for disallowance of
punitive damages against municipalities. The taxpayers, who are to receive
the benefits from the infliction of punitive damages awards upon
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any cittzen ol the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
140. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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142. See cases cited in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.1 1 (1978).
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wrongdoers, are the same group who are paying for the awards.
Furthermore, because of the widespread reluctance of courts to allow
punitive damages against municipalities in tie absence of express statutory
authority, the statues abrogating common-law immunity should be
interpreted strictly against punitive damages. Instead, the court in Young
created a paradox whereby punitive damages are not permitted against the
state and are permitted against the municipality. There are sound policy
reasons to continue the widespread protection of municipalities from
punitive damage awards that must be weighed in the absence of a relevant
statute, as well as in interpretation of statutes that would possibly permit
them.
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